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"Energy Options in the East Mediterranean", an IENE Study (M72)

Authors: Costis Stambolis, Energy Analyst, Chairman IENE, Kostis Oikonomopoulos, Petroleum Geoscientist, Research Fellow IENE, John Roberts, Energy Security Specialist, Senior Research Fellow IENE

Institute of Energy for SE Europe (IENE)

INSTITUTE OF ENERGY
FOR SOUTH EAST EUROPE

Outline

- The geopolitical importance of the region
- Economic and social parameters
- Natural resources
- Oil supply/demand
- Natural gas supply/demand
- Power generation/electricity interconnectors
- Renewables
- Hydrogen
- Energy security parameters
- Iran’s gamble
- Key messages

Why the East Mediterranean?

- There are several reasons why a focus is necessary on the energy options available today in the East Mediterranean area
- The cradle of western civilisation, the birth place of cross-border trade and the three main religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam)
- Its opposing shores are close enough to permit easy contact, but far enough apart to allow societies to develop distinctly under the influence of their hinterland as well as of one another (David Abulafia)
- In today's interconnected digital world natural and religious barriers have not eclipsed (see Middle East conflicts over the last 75 years and the current war in Israel/Gaza)
- However, this extended region may still provide answers to today's quest for new energy supplies and transformative technologies, to help meet not only its own needs but also support energy demand in Europe
- As it happened in the past, today the East Mediterranean because of its cultural diversity and entrepreneurial spirit may lead the way in line with modern day needs
- In the past, trading in wheat, wood and wool provided the backbone of its affluence. Today, trading in energy (oil, gas, electricity, hydrogen) could lead to a new renaissance
- As in the past, even today, the East Mediterranean can be understood in terms of control of key energy routes across the sea. This is especially important in the case of energy whether oil & gas or electricity.

The geopolitical importance of the region



- At the crossroads between Middle East, North Africa and Europe.
- Advantageous geostrategic location (chokepoint and gateway)
- Yet in a dangerous shatter belt
- Between 2 regional conflict areas (Ukraine, Middle East)
- Proximity to Middle East, major energy producers, like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran
- East Med has the potential of becoming a major energy supplier to Europe
  - Prolific H/C region
  - High renewable potential
  - Energy-thirsty Europe

Economic and social parameters



- Diverse demographics, politics, and economies.
- Mixture of developed (Greece, Cyprus, Israel) and emerging economies
- Aim to exploit and export local energy resources.
- Political tensions impact countries differently.
- Energy viewed as a tool for peace and prosperity.

- Greece
  - 2% GDP growth in 2023; projected 2.2% in 2024. Unemployment at 11.1%, inflation, and high public debt remain concerns.
- Cyprus
  - 2.5% GDP growth in 2023; projected 2.8% in 2024. Employment rising, inflation decreasing, and budget surplus maintained.
- Turkey
  - 4.5% GDP growth in 2023; projected 3% in 2024. High inflation, productivity issues, and significant earthquake recovery needs.
- Israel
  - 1.9% GDP growth projected in 2024; expected to rebound to 4.6% in 2025. Stable inflation, increased military spending.
- Egypt
  - 33.8% inflation in 2023. GDP growth to drop to 2.8% in FY24, recovery expected with structural reforms.
- Lebanon
  - Ongoing economic crisis, modest growth reversed by regional conflict. High inflation, unemployment, and unsustainable public debt.

Oil and gas exploration and production

Strong position

- Israel
  - Gas reserves 1,087 bcm (2022)
  - Production: 25.3 bcm/y (2023)
  - 46% exported
- Egypt
  - Oil production: 613,000 b/day (2022)
  - Gas production: 64.5 bcm/y (2022)
  - Gas production: -11%, 57.1 bcm/y (2023)
  - 65 new discoveries (2023)
  - 83 wells drilled (2023)





- Turkey
  - 349 exploration licenses (2022)
  - 156 production licenses (2022)
  - 174 wells drilled (2021), 150 wells drilled (2020)
  - Oil reserves: 600 million barrels (2022)
  - Gas reserves: 710 bcm (2023)



- Cyprus
  - Several discoveries since “Aphrodite” (2011)
  - “Aphrodite” development agreement pending

Oil and gas exploration and production

Weak position

- Greece
  - 13 concessions (2020)
  - 9 active concessions today (ExxonMobil, Energean, HelleniQ)
  - TotalEnergies and Repsol left
  - 1st well expected in 2025-2026 offshore Crete
- Lebanon
  - No commercial quantities
  - 3rd licensing round expires in July 2024
  - On offer all unlicensed blocks
- Syria
  - -74% oil production (2011-2022)
  - -58% gas production (2011-2022)
  - Oil and gas infrastructure command





Oil Supply/Demand

- Egypt is the main oil producer in the region
  - 613,000 b/day (2022)
- Turkey
  - From 40,000 b/day (2017) to 65,000 b/day (2022)
  - Anticipated to reach 100,000 b/day by 2035 (Mount Gabar discovery, December 2023)



However this production is not enough

The region is a net oil importer

Natural Gas Supply/Demand

Egypt





- Until 2003 supply/demand moved in step
- Production increased allowing exports
- Production declined in 2023 (summer demand)
- LNG exports stopped in 2023
- Balance was achieved from increased imports from Israel (8.7 bcm, 2023)

it seems unlikely that the MOU signed with the EU in June 2022 regarding exporting gas to EU will be fulfilled in the near future

Natural Gas Supply/Demand

Israel



- Significant gas producer
- Gas exporter since 2020
- Exporting to Egypt and Jordan
  - 8.7 bcm in 2023 to Egypt
- No direct link to the international gas market

That could change either by:

- a pipeline (EastMed pipeline) or
- via Egypt (LNG plants)

The expanded gas corridor in SE Europe



Existing pipeline infrastructure in the East Med



Source: *DW*

Electricity in the East Med

- The supply of uninterrupted and competitively priced electricity in the region is of outmost importance for daily survival and economic development
- Power generation is achieved through a combination of indigenous (i.e. gas, oil, RES, nuclear) and imported fuels (mainly oil, gas, electricity)
- The big challenge for East Med electricity remains the increase of power generation from local sources
- As power generation capability increases at country level and electrification advances in view of climate goals, so is the need for cross-border interconnections
- A number of electricity interconnection projects is underway (e.g Great Sea Interconnector, GREGY, Green Aegean, etc.)
- In addition to the East Med countries the need for cross-border electricity interconnections encompasses others in the neighbourhood – Saudi Arabia, Jordan
- These are potential power generators with excess electricity capacity for export



Installed electricity capacity

Country	Installed Capacity (GW, 2022)
Greece	22
Cyprus	2.1
Turkey	104
Israel	22
Egypt	59
Lebanon	4.1
Syria	10

Source: *U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) www.eia.gov*

Electricity interconnectors



- Green Aegean Interconnector, 9 GW to Europe



- The Great Sea interconnector took over from EuroAsia in December 2023
- Capacity: 1 GW
- Establishment of the special purpose company “Saudi Greek Interconnection” (Feb. 2024)

- EuroGulf Interconnector
- ProjectCapacity: 2 GW

- GREGY interconnector (3 GW)
- was specifically mentioned in the Joint Declaration on the Strategic & Comprehensive Partnership between Egypt/EU (March 2024) (although there was no reference to gas or the 2022 MOU)

Renewables play an increasing important role in Eas Med energy policies



Average wind speeds (m/sec) map



Photovoltaic Power Output map

- Greece ambitious RES targets (44% total gross energy consumption by 2030)
- Greece, 50% electricity produced from RES (2023)
- Turkey approximately 40%
- Turkey is a rising star in the realm of geothermal energy, ranked 4th in world
- Israel is aiming for 30% RES in power generation by 2030 (<7% in 2020)
- Egypt is aiming for over 30% RES in the energy mix by 2035

Hydrogen

- Russia’s invasion in Ukraine has reshaped EU energy policy and has placed Hydrogen in its core agenda
- EU Hydrogen Strategy
  - Aims to diversify and decarbonize energy, reduce Russian imports, establish market frameworks, and leverage international partnerships.
- European Hydrogen Bank
  - Addresses investment hurdles, bridges cost gaps, aggregates demand, and negotiates prices with global producers.
- Greece's Hydrogen Goals
  - Targets for 2030 and 2050 include significant electrolyzer installations
  - Blending hydrogen with natural gas
  - utilizing existing infrastructure for hydrogen storage.
- Turkey's Hydrogen Strategy
  - Emphasizes green hydrogen production
  - aims for significant electrolyzer capacity
  - South Marmara Hydrogen Coast Valley Project.
- Egypt's Hydrogen Ambitions
  - Leverages strategic location and renewable energy
  - enacts supportive legislation,
  - major global player status in the green hydrogen sector.

Energy security parameters in the East Med

- External Threats
  - Gulf tensions, Red Sea instability, and Russia-Ukraine war impact regional energy security, causing oil price spikes and rerouting of tankers around the Cape of Good Hope.
- Regional Dynamics
  - Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Turkey-Greece tensions have minimal direct impact on energy projects, while Israel-Egypt gas relationship is crucial for regional energy stability.
- Disruptions and Sanctions
  - Ukraine conflict affects Kazakh oil routes; potential sanctions on Russian LNG could increase demand for US LNG in Europe.
- EU Gas Supply Agreements
  - MoUs with Israel, Egypt, and Azerbaijan aim to secure alternative gas supplies, but face challenges from Egypt’s domestic demand and slow Azerbaijani field development.
- Impact from Prolonged Conflicts
  - Continued Gaza war could strain Israeli-Egyptian relations and halt pipeline projects to Türkiye; development of Gaza Marine gas field depends on a peace settlement.

Iran's aspirations and the dormant geopolitical rift

- In view of latest developments Iran' expanded role in the region is going to strengthen rather than diminish
- The axis of resistance (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraq militias, Syrian army etc.) is gaining ground
- The ongoing conflict in Gaza and Hamas eventual capitulation will not deter Iran's expansionist plans
- There is a constant danger of an overflow of hostilities in the broader Middle East
- There is definite geopolitical impact stemming from Iran's current policies in the region (e.g. Houthis campaign against seaborne trade, oil supply uncertainty)
- Can this negative situation be contained and to what extent?
- Is Iran going to become a nuclear power?



Key messages (1/2)

- Understanding the geography of the region is of paramount importance
  - Major energy producers (for example Saudi Arabia)
  - Iran
  - Iraq
  - Gulf of Suez
  - Caspian Sea
  - Black Sea
  - European Union
- Can this region become an energy exporter to Europe?
  - Prolific H/C resources
  - High RES potential
  - BUT can it cover the regional demand?
  - Can it actually export any energy surplus?
  - For example, Egypt has reduced gas production, has stopped LNG exports
  - Greece has been left behind regarding E&P
  - How will this affect the regional supply/demand dynamics?
- Electrification
  - Can the region's grids support the energy transition?
  - If not, what must be done?
  - Can cross-border electricity interconnectors accelerate energy transition?

Key messages (2/2)

- Where does Saudi Arabia fit in?
  - Can it export electricity via Egypt but
  - It can also export via Jordan
- What about Iran and Iraq?
  - How will these two (2) countries affect the regional balance?
- Different cultures, diverse economies and never ending hostilities. Can this change?
  - How cooperation between such a diverse mixture of countries be successful?
- Turkey
  - Turkey is drifting away from the West
  - Can it return?
  - Turkey-Iran relations have affected the US-Turkish relations
  - Cyprus-Turkey, Greece-Turkey relations.
  - Turkey not willing to follow UNCLOS
  - How can there be any regional cooperation without Turkey?

Thank you for your attention!

Kostis Oikonomopoulos

Petroleum Geoscientist, Research Fellow IENE

East Med Energy Study Project Coordinator

koikonomopoulos@iene.gr

+30 697 477 8695

https://www.linkedin.com/in/kostis-oikonomopoulos/