



# SCHIZOPHRENIC ENERGY PHASE



GINA COHEN – 2.12.2021



# Israel in Energy Transition

## Israel



**Cool:** To end by end 2026 (could it be earlier)

**Renewables:** Only 7%; 30% goal by 2030 likely unachievable; electric cars far from achieving goal

**Exploration:** Israel now has Chevron & Mubadala, Energean drilling Q122; MEW not opening for now offshore licensing

**Exports to Jordan & Egypt:** Progressing better than anticipated

**Exports via Egypt LNG or FLNG/EastMed Poseidon:** Shell, Petronas & diversion issues; Feasibility studies conducted; Awaiting new policies

## Jordan Egypt PA



**Jordan:** 2.5 TWh renewable out of 21 TWh (1500 MW)


**Egypt:** Power: 90% gas, 10% renewables (small volumes of fueloil)

**PA** Not developed gas, no progress on gas purchases or Jenin IPP




# GHG from power & Transportation in Israel (mt)

## CO<sup>2</sup> Emissions from Power



## CO<sup>2</sup> Emissions from Transportation





# East Med Issues

## Regional Tensions



**Turkey:** Gunboat diplomacy; EU/NATO frictions; US-Turkey relations; but new “talks” with Israel & Greece

**EEZ disputes:** Turkey -- Cyprus -- Israel --Palestine - Lebanon – Libya

**Cyprus:** Cypro; high electricity prices; Aphrodite limbo, FSRU delay

**Egypt:** Gas hub aspirations; uncertainty of S&D; LNG SRMC of \$6.3

**Other:** Increasingly aggressive Iran in region; weakening of EU due to socioeconomic problems

## Global Dynamics



**IOCs & financial institutes** continue to reduce investments in fossils


**Most global economies** committed to net-0 emissions by 2050

**EU shifting to** Green New Deal and Fit-for-55 package

**IEA Roadmap to Net-zero by 2050** calls for suspending new O&G E&P by mid-2020s & predicts LNG exports peak this decade before prices decline



# Egyptian gas to Lebanon via Jordan & Syria



- 300-600 mmcmg/y; WB must fund Syria Lebanon leg
- Gas flows: Have been from Egypt to Jordan; No gas flowed from Jordan to Syria, or Lebanon since 2010
- Gas from Egypt will flow no further than Jordan. Jordan uses AGP in north southbound to supply gas for Leviathan to CCGT plants at Samra (1.24GW), Zarqa (485MW)
- 50-60mn cfd that Jordan imports from Egypt via the AGP only goes as far as the 600MW steam turbine power plant at Aqaba. Additional Egyptian volumes would enable supplies to extend north to 370MW Qatraneh plant & maybe the Amman East & Kepco
- Sections of the pipe in Syria are used to distribute its own 600mn cfd gas (330 km). Lines “OK”, repairs needed on Lebanese lines.
- Gas would ultimately end up at Lebanon’s 460MW Deir Ammar CCGT plant near Tripoli, the only plant in the country capable of receiving gas. Additional gas could be burned in Syria’s power stations and exported to Lebanon that has only 2GW of capacity. The only cross-border connections are low voltage and these have suffered recent damage, would cost \$3.5mn to fix lines

Positive geopolitical implications for: Israel, Syria, Egypt + US involvement



## Looking Ahead



**Re-assess** common interests in the region to address urgent issues

**Pursue** rapprochement, diplomacy and conflict resolution

**Create** geopolitical climate to supports gas infrastructure, e.g. G-2-G agreements; regional rather than global exports

**Develop** power interconnectors with neighboring & EU (EuroAsia/Africa)  
Israel Jordan UAE signed MOU on water-power exchange

**technology** CCS, hydrogen, batteries, cut methane & flaring; (only nuclear in “area” is UAE)

**Reduce** financial uncertainty for gas producers

**Re-examine** option of gas exports to PA, Turkey, E Europe

**Establish** regulations for FLNG units, liquefaction and LNG exports

**Distinguish** hype, photo ops, MOUs FROM FACTS